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The article deals with the recent controversies over the interpretations of World War II. The domi-
nant narrative of World War II, which was created after 1945 to ensure the basis of legitimacy 
for the Yugoslav Communist regime, was revised at the beginning of the 1990s. One of the con-
sequences of this revision has been the upsurge of historical revisionism regarding the fascist 
Ustashe movement. After years of bitter debates that had divided and polarized the Croatian so-
ciety, the government appointed in 2017 a special council to deal with the World War II past and 
make the recommendations on the public usage of the symbols and insignia of the 20th century 
“undemocratic regimes”. The final product of its work was the so-called Dialogue Document 
whose provisions and impact are dealt with in the second part of the text. 
Keywords: World War II; Dialogue Document; reconciliation; the Ustashe insignia; Jasenovac
1. World War II and the politics of history  
in Croatia since 1990
In March 2017, the Croatian government made a decision to establish 
the Council for Dealing with the Consequences of Undemocratic Regimes 
that was made up of representatives of Croatia’s top scientific, cultural and 
memorial institutions. The Council was charged with the task to draft com-
prehensive recommendations aimed at dealing with the legacy of the 20th 
century “undemocratic regimes”. The term “undemocratic regimes” in this 
context referred to World War II movements, organizations and regimes, 
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as well as the socialist Yugoslavia era.1 The World War II topics have been 
in the center of bitter debates ever since Croatia gained its independence at 
the beginning of the 1990s. The roots of these political debates and ideo-
logical conflicts need to be traced not only in World War II events, but also 
in post-1945 and post-1990 interpretations of these events. 
There was a massive conflict on the territory of Yugoslavia between 
1941 and 1945. As a consequence of military operations and air-raids, 
a brutal civil war, mass executions and retaliations, the Holocaust and the 
Porajmos, the human cost of the war was enormous. It is estimated to have 
been around one million out of approximately 16 million inhabitants in 
Yugoslavia before the war; civilian victims made up more than half of that 
number. During the war, Croats were politically and ideologically divided 
between the Partisan movement, led by the Communist Party of Yugosla-
via (hereafter: the KPJ), and the Independent State of Croatia (hereafter: 
the NDH) run by the Ustashe. The main goals of the Partisans and their 
Communist leadership were to fight the Axis occupying forces and their 
collaborators and to restore Yugoslavia, a former monarchy, as a federal 
republic with a Soviet-style government. The KPJ was founded in 1919, 
but it was banned soon afterwards and remained an illegal underground 
group for the rest of the interwar period; at the time, it was firmly linked 
to the USSR and the Comintern. Its leadership (with Josip Broz Tito as 
its secretary general since 1937) launched the Partisan resistance move-
ment soon after the occupation of Yugoslavia in April 1941. At the same 
time, the Ustashe were appointed to rule the NDH, a fascist puppet state 
established by the Axis. The Ustashe movement was founded in Italy at 
the beginning of the 1930s, emphasizing as its aim the formation of an 
independent Croatia. The ideology of this movement was a blend of fas-
cism and Croatian nationalism. During World War II, the Ustashe regime 
committed genocide against Serbs, Jews and Roma and murdered numer-
ous antifascists. Partisans carried out the main fighting against the Axis 
and its collaborators and got support from the major Allied powers – con-
sequently, after the war Yugoslavia was restored as a federal republic and 
a communist state. During and after the final stages of the war, Partisan 
1 The decision of the Government of Republic of Croatia on establishing the Council for 
Dealing with the Consequences of Undemocratic Regimes, March 2, 2017. 
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units and the Yugoslav authorities carried out reprisals, including forced 
marches and mass executions of tens of thousands captured collaborators, 
deportations of ethnic Germans, atrocities against Italians, etc (Tomase-
vich, 2001, 718–750). In post-war Yugoslavia, the “National Liberation 
Struggle” (this is how the 1941–1945 war used to be called in Yugoslavia; 
hereafter: the NOB) was a topic of particular significance. The story of 
how the KPJ organized and led a successful resistance movement of all 
Yugoslav nations fighting against fascism was meant to ensure the basis of 
legitimacy for the Yugoslav Communist regime. The atrocities committed 
by Partisan forces during and immediately after World War II were never 
mentioned and never became part of the official narrative (e.g., in history 
textbooks; Koren, 2012, passim).
In the period of political changes that occurred in Croatia during and 
after the collapse of Yugoslavia, it was precisely this narrative of World 
War II that came under scrutiny, which was very much determined by the 
contemporary political needs. Since 1990, the most influential political 
party in Croatia has been the Croatian Democratic Union (hereafter: the 
HDZ). The HDZ was founded in 1989 and it has been in power for most 
of the period since 1990 (1990–2000, 2003–2011, and since the begin-
ning of 2016). It is a conservative right-wing party; its political attitudes 
vary from center-right to radical-right. The politics of history of the HDZ 
has strongly been colored by the ideology of ethnic nationalism. In early 
1990s, its political leadership pushed for the creation of an independent 
and ethnically homogeneous Croatian state. In order to achieve this goal, 
they promoted the idea of “national reconciliation” among the Croats, i.e. 
among the former World War II adversaries (the Partisans and the Ustashe) 
and their descendants. But, this concept of reconciliation was also very 
much driven by the needs of the HDZ leadership to reconcile conflicting 
narratives within the party. Some of the founders of the HDZ were former 
communists, former members of the Yugoslav army, police, and secret ser-
vices; at the same time, they needed the support from émigré circles who 
were very much influenced by those who fled Croatia at the very end of 
World War II either because they were strongly affiliated with the NDH or 
because they were opponents of the Yugoslav Communist regime (Koren, 
2015, 11–17). Another important element of the HDZ politics of history 
was the claim that Croats managed to preserve an uninterrupted continuity 
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of their state since the Early Middle Ages, struggling against forces that 
tried to prevent them to make an independent state (the “thousand-year 
national identity and state continuity of the Croatian nation” and the “his-
torical right of the Croatian nation to full state sovereignty”, as it is said in 
the introduction to the Croatian Constitution adopted in 19902). 
As a consequence of this politics of history, the monolithic, uncrit-
ical and rather mythologized narrative from the Communist period was 
replaced with another, equally monolithic, uncritical and mythologized. Its 
purpose was not to encourage a pluralist view of the Croatian contemporary 
history, but to replace one official history (“one truth”) with another. In 
this new narrative of the 20th century history, both Yugoslav states were 
presented as entities that were created only to secure Serbian domination 
and therefore as essentially anti-Croat. The legacy of the Partisan move-
ment became problematic because it involved not only fighting against 
fascism, but also the reconstruction of Yugoslavia after the war. Another 
consequence of this politics of history has been the upsurge of histor ical 
revisionism regarding the Ustashe who have been, especially among radi-
cal-right groups, rehabilitated as fighters for an independent Croatia. Pub-
lic display of the Ustashe insignia, and using of the Ustashe salute “For 
Home–Ready”, although prohibited by the law,3 has increasingly been tol-
erated. Thousands of monuments erected to memorialize the Partisan strug-
gle or the KPJ history were destroyed or damaged during the 1990s; names 
that recalled a partisan fight during World War II or the achievements of 
socialism have been removed from public spaces. However, these prac-
tices remain the source of constant conflict between those who want these 
street names or monuments to be removed and those who oppose such ac-
tions (Rihtman-Auguštin, 2000; Stanić, Šakaja, Slavuj, 2009; Pavlaković, 
2011). For example, attempts to change the name of the Square of Victims 
of Fascism in Zagreb led even to physical clashes in the 1990s; Zagreb city 
2 The Croatian Constitution (2010). Part I. Historical Foundations. 
3 The existing Penal Code (Article 325) sanctions denial of genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and crimes of aggression, provided that such denial is aimed at fostering 
national, ethnic, racial, religious etc. hatred or violence. It also sanctions the activities that 
call for violence or hatred against a group of people or an individual member of the group 
because of their race, religion, national or ethnic affiliation, origin, color, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, gender identity or disability. 
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assembly voted to strip the Tito’s name from one of the city’s main squares 
in 2017, a decision that has remained controversial to date. 
In the search of a “thousand-year continuity of the Croatian state”, 
even the establishment of the NDH was reinterpreted as a positive histor-
ical fact at the beginning of the 1990s. In the official discourse, Ustashe 
atrocities were formally condemned, but in reality marginalized and sup-
pressed.4 The story of the mass killings of war prisoners committed by 
Partisans at the end of the war that was suppressed in the history books 
of socialist Yugoslavia was now given a prominent place. The Croatian 
Parliament became a sponsor of annual commemorations near the town of 
Bleiburg on the Austrian-Slovenian border, which memorialize events at 
the very end of the war when Partisan forces committed mass liquidations 
of captured war adversaries, mostly soldiers of the NDH. The Bleiburg 
commemorations have been controversial because they were established 
in the 1950s by Croatian émigré circles and regularly served not only to 
pay homage to the victims, but also as a memorial celebration of the NDH 
(Pavlaković, Pauković, Brentin, 2018; Tokić, 2018). On the other hand, 
there have also been periods since 1990 when this narrative was, more or 
less intensively, called into question, especially when the left or left-liberal 
political parties were in power (for example, in 2000–2003 or 2011–2015, 
during the coalition governments led by Social Democrats, the largest par-
ty of the Croatian center-left which evolved from the former League of 
Communists of Croatia). 
2. Recent debates and Dialogue Document
The intensity of these debates was temporarily diminished during the 
EU accession process when the major political parties were oriented to-
wards the future and dealing with the past did not play such a prominent 
role in their politics (although the debates about the 1991–1995 war and 
4 In the official history textbook published in 1992 there were seven pages in the lesson 
about the NDH. There was a lot of material dedicated to the territorial organization, political 
institutions and the armed forces of the NDH, as well as culture in the NDH, but only half of 
one sentence was dedicated to the atrocities committed by the Ustashe regime against Serbs, 
Jews and Roma (Perić, 1992, 103–105).
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the legacy of the 1990s erupted at the same time). But after Croatia joined 
the EU in 2013, a trend of nationalism began to reappear, which coincided 
with the escalation of the economic crisis. This renewed trend of nation-
alism was evident in the last presidential and general election campaign 
(2014 and 2015). Especially the then oppositional HDZ, as well as some 
other right-wing political parties, returned to the nationalist rhetoric of 
the 1990s and used historical themes as part of their campaign strategy. 
(cf. Jović, 2015) They demanded lustration of the former members of the 
Communist Party (even though they could be found in both major polit-
ical parties), removal of the Josip Broz Tito’s name from all public spaces, 
rewriting school history curricula and textbooks, and instilling patriot-
ism through culture and education. They also claimed that the communist 
crimes were not researched properly and for that reason the sentiments 
about the period of socialist Yugoslavia still exist in the Croatian society.5 
These groups have formally adopted the politics of memory of the Eu-
ropean Parliament resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism 
(2009) and claim that they are against “all totalitarianisms”. They strongly 
condemn “the Communist crimes in Croatia”, but as a rule are reluctant 
to clearly address and condemn the crimes of the Ustashe regime and the 
legacy of the NDH.6 These groups tend to reject any positive memory of 
the Partisans as a resistance and antifascist movement and place it only in 
the context of war atrocities and the creation of Communist Yugoslavia. 
They also claim that the reconciliation in the 1990s was misused by those 
who “never got over the breakup of Yugoslavia and never wanted an inde-
pendent Croatia” and who allegedly want to restore Yugoslavia.7 In reality, 
there is no political party or any significant political actor in Croatia who 
would advocate such ideas and this backlash against imaginary Yugoslavs 
is used only as a means to fight political battles (cf. Cipek, 2017). In the 
5 E.g. statements of Tomislav Karamarko, the leader of the HDZ at the time (Koren, 
2015, 11–16).
6 E.g. the speech by President of the Croatian Parliament Željko Reiner on commemo-
rating the European Day of Remembrance of Victims of All Totalitarian and Authoritarian 
Regimes, August 23, 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.sabor.hr/hr/zastupnici/predsjednik/
govori/govor-predsjednika-hrvatskoga-sabora-zeljka-reinera-na-obiljezavanju 
7 E.g. “Moj antikomunistički manifest,” an interview with Tomislav Karamarko in Glo­
bus, no. 1276, May 22, 2015.
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long run, however, all these political strategies and tactics in the last quar-
ter of the century have had a negative effect because they did not resolve 
any of the open questions about the past, either those about crimes com-
mitted during World War II or human rights violations during the Yugoslav 
communist regime. Because these strategies are mostly used as a means 
to fight short-term political battles, they constantly re-open another circle 
of recriminations and fruitless debates in an already polarized society (cf. 
Blanuša, 2017). 
After the 2015 general election, the conservative coalition of differ-
ent parties and groups (ranging from moderate, center-right groups to 
rad ical right groups which based their program on rigid nationalism and 
socially conservative views), led by the HDZ, formed the government in 
January 2016. The conservative coalition government continued to deepen 
ideological rifts in the society with its radical rhetoric, threaten freedom 
of expression, and put political pressure on state-funded public media. Af-
ter only four and half months, however, it lost support in the Parliament. 
Snap elections ensued, and more moderate center-right government (still 
led by the HDZ) took office in October 2017. The new party leadership 
seeks to move away from the ideological conflicts of the past. But there 
are other, more radical factions in the HDZ that continue to use history 
as a means to revive contemporary political debates and divisions. Fur-
thermore, in the last couple of years, there has been a growing number of 
other groups within society who try to rehabilitate the NDH and downplay 
or even negate crimes and genocide committed by the Ustashe regime. 
There has also been a number of other similar incidents associated with 
the glorification of the NDH, such as chanting the Ustashe salute at sports 
events and concerts,8 the celebration of April 10, the date when the NDH 
was established (Pavlaković, 2008), the displaying of Ustashe symbols, 
8 In a 2013, a player of a national football team, Joe Simunic, led the public in the sta-
dium to chant the Ustashe slogan “For Home–Ready” after the victory against Island in qu-
alifications for the World Championship. He was sentenced by FIFA and banned from playing 
in 10 following games for the national team, which prevented him from participating in the 
World Championship in Brasil. Another well-known case is the one of a popular singer Mar-
ko Perković Thompson, who regularly starts his concerts with a song that begins with the 
chant For Home–Ready (the song was made in 1991). This is often overlooked in Croatia, but 
his concerts were banned in several European countries (Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
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etc. In November 2018, The Office of Ombudsman warned in an analysis 
that attempts of World War II historical revisionism and downplaying the 
Ustashe crimes undermine the fundamental values of the Constitution.9
The most poignant part of this historical negationism has been battling 
over the number of victims of the largest death and concentration camp in 
the NDH, Jasenovac that was established and run by the Ustashe. Tens of 
thousands of Serbs, Jews, Roma, anti-fascist or dissident Croats and other 
inmates were murdered there between 1941 and 1945. Recent estimates 
indicate that the Ustashe regime murdered between 90,000 and 100,000 
people in Jasenovac.10 In recent years, however, there are a number of 
groups who openly negate the character of Jasenovac as a death camp and 
try to minimize the number of victims (cf. Kasapović, 2018). One of these 
groups, the Society for Research of the Threefold Jasenovac Camp, denies 
that there was a death camp in Jasenovac in the period of 1941–1945 (for 
them, it was only a work camp for the opponents of the NDH) and claims, 
without any proofs, that the Yugoslav Communists established two con-
centration camps on the site of the former Ustashe camp in the second 
half of the 1940s, one immediately after World War II and another during 
the Tito–Stalin split. The Society was granted around 6600 Euros for its 
research into archival material by the War Veterans’ Ministry in 2017.11 
The book on Jasenovac (titled Work Camp Jasenovac) published by the 
Society was promoted at the state-funded public television.12 Furthermore, 
the public institution Jasenovac Memorial Site published a report stating 
9 “Relativisation of the Ustasha crimes violates the fundamental values of the Constitu-
tion, with a lack of reaction opening room to hatred” (2018, November 20). Retrieved from: 
http://ombudsman.hr/en/all-news/discrimination/discrimination-article/1497-relativisation-
of-the-ustasha-crimes-violates-the-fundamental-values-of-the-constitution-with-a-lack-of-
reaction-opening-room-to-hatred .
10 Since World War II, there has been much debate and controversy regarding the charac-
ter and the number of victims killed at the Jasenovac camp. For more details on the history 
of Jasenovac and on the debates about Jasenovac v. Goldstein, Goldstein, 2011; Goldstein, 
2016; 2018.
11 V.: “Društvo započelo provedbu projekta s podrškom Ministarstva hrvatskih branite-
lja” (2018, January 2). Retrieved from: https://drustvojasenovac.wordpress.com/2018/01/03/
drustvo-zapocelo-provedbu-projekta-s-podrskom-ministarstva-hrvatskih-branitelja/.
12 V.: “Priopćenje Javne ustanove spomen-područja Jasenovac povodom gostovanja Igo-
ra Vukića u emisiji “Dobar dan, Hrvatska” Hrvatske radiotelevizije” (2018, June 4). Retrie-
ved from: http://www.historiografija.hr/?p=10156.
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that only 9 school groups visited the site of the former concentration camp 
in 2017; a report for 2018 shows modest increase in number of organized 
visits of students (15 groups).13 
In this political context, the Croatian government came to a decision 
to establish the Council for Coming into Terms with the Consequences of 
Undemocratic Regimes (hereafter: the Council). The government first men-
tioned setting up the Council during a heated controversy over a commem-
orative plaque with Ustashe slogan “For Home–Ready”. The plaque was 
installed in November 2016 on the kindergarten’s building in a small town 
of Jasenovac, near the Jasenovac Memorial Site. It was commissioned and 
installed by some veteran members of the paramilitary unit from the 1991– 
–1995 war, the Croatian Defense Forces (hereafter: the HOS). This unit bore 
the same name as the armed forces of the NDH in 1944–1945 and used the 
Ustashe insignia during the war. It still uses the salute “For Home–Ready” 
as part of its officially approved coat of arms. Many called for the immediate 
removal of the plaque, and when the government failed to do that, Jewish 
and Serbian organizations boycotted annual Jasenovac commemoration (it 
was the second boycott in a row). But, any such action was strongly op-
posed by some associations of war veterans from the 1991–1995 war. The 
“Homeland War” – this is how the 1991–1995 war is officially called in 
Croatia – has been in recent years increasingly portrayed as a decisive event 
in Croatian history, the “victory of the Croatian people and Croatian defend-
ers in the just, legitimate, defensive and liberating Homeland War”.14 It often 
leads to an uncritical glorification of the war, and any attempt of criticism is 
qualified as “belittling of the values of the Homeland War and its heroes”. 
(Jović, 2017, passim) Although these groups acknowledge that the salute 
“For Home–Ready” was used by the Ustashe, they justify its use by claim-
ing that it is actually an old Croatian salute (in fact, there is a wide consen-
sus among historians that it originated from the Ustashe movement). For 
them, the salute was somehow “redeemed” because it was also used by the 
Croatian soldiers during the 1991–1995 war, although it was used exactly to 
13 For the reports v.: http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=8815 (the report for 
2017) and http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=5027 (the report for 2018).
14 The Croatian Constitution, Part I. Historical Foundations. The term Croatian defend­
ers is officially used in Croatia to designate soldiers in the Croatian Army during the 1991– 
–1995 war.
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evoke the memory of the Ustashe and the NDH in the fight against the Serbs. 
The following two statements made in a political talk-show on a public tel-
evision illustrate these polarized views:15
Any attack […] on the HOS, on its contribution to the Homeland War, on its wartime 
insignia, on its war record, is also an attack on the Homeland war, and thereby an at-
tack on the Croatian state. (Anto Đapić, a politician and an active member of the HOS 
during the 1991–1995 war).
If you celebrate April 10, if you name your unit after the officer of the Ustashe army 
in World War II, if you use a salute that was used at the time, if you have the same 
color of uniform as the Ustashe had, and if you, in your speech on April 10, 2016 in the 
city of Split, say that the NDH was the only Croatian state when a dream came true for 
a short period of time, then you cannot say that you have nothing to do with World War 
II. (Arsen Bauk, a politician from the SDP, in response to Đapić’s claim that the HOS 
has nothing to do with World War II).
Because of these contemporary echoes of the World War II allegiances 
and divisions, the Council’s task was not only to deal with the war past. It 
also included the making of recommendations regarding the legal regula-
tion of the use of the insignia and symbols of “undemocratic regimes”, as 
well as proposals for the scientific research, the politics of remembrance 
(whether the figures from these regimes should have public spaces named 
after them), and “ways of educating children and adolescents in connection 
with violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms during the gov-
ernment of undemocratic regimes”.16 Although it was not explicitly men-
tioned among its tasks, the making of the recommendations of the legal 
regulation for the use of the symbols of non-democratic regimes obviously 
meant dealing with the 1991–1995 war as well. That was another sensitive 
topic that needed to be addressed by the Council. 
The Council was given one year to fulfill these tasks. At the beginning 
of its work, the president of the council said to the media that “the Coun-
cil’s basic objective is to replace a practice of intolerance with a construc-
tive dialogue”. It will also seek “to ease the way towards reconciliation 
15 These statements were made in the political talk-show Otvoreno on the Croatian 
Television (2018, November 29). Retrieved from: https://vijesti.hrt.hr/475247/otvoreno-o-
optuzama-za-toleriranje-povijesnog-revizionizma.
16 The decision of the Government of Republic of Croatia on establishing the Council for 
Dealing with the Consequences of Undemocratic Regimes, March 2, 2017. 
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in the society, tackle uncritical positions on the both regimes, as well as 
preventing young people from being subjected to politically motivated in-
terpretations of history. He expressed optimism that the recommendations 
„will serve as a landmark for the future and in the long run, will contribute 
to calming passion and overcoming divisions” (quoted in Milekic, 2017b). 
It was clear, however, that the Council was given a complex task, and from 
the outset many were skeptical about the possibilities of achieving these 
ambitious goals or even reaching a consensus among the Council’s mem-
bers because of their differing views. Others warned that the real purpose 
of establishing the Council was far more prosaic: it was founded to buy 
the government some time before it makes a political decision about the 
removal of the plaque from Jasenovac (e.g. Milekic, 2017a). 
In early March 2018, after months of going back-and-forth, the Coun-
cil announced that it produced a document which was supposed to serve 
as a basis for the drafting of legal regulations. It was named Dialogue 
Document. The document was a compromise, albeit a difficult one: at its 
meeting on 28 February 2018 the Council adopted the conclusion that the 
Document was acceptable to some members, but only partially acceptable 
to others. The Council decided not to vote on its final version, but those 
members who had differing views should later deliver their statements as 
dissenting opinions. Eight out of the total of 17 Council members used that 
opportunity! 
The first part of the document17 describes a historical background of 
the Croatian experience with “undemocratic regimes” in the 20th century 
and defines the key concepts, fascism and communism. The definition of 
communism focuses on how it “seeks to achieve comprehensive authority 
over all segments of society” (the existence of only one allowed party as-
sociated with an administrative system and a repressive apparatus, mass 
persecution and victims among “class enemies” and other “hostile ele-
ments” etc.). In much shorter definition, fascism is more or less reduced 
to nationalism and nationalist expansion, while all other aspects that are 
crucial to understanding this phenomenon are ignored (Dialogue Docu­
ment, 1). The document lists particular communist crimes during and after 
World War II in Yugoslavia, but it fails to do so regarding the “fascist” 
17 For the detailed analysis of Dialogue Document v.: Cvijanović, 2018, 122–141.
154 Snježana Koren
crimes – they are recognized only in general terms. Thus, using fascism 
as an umbrella term proves to be particularly problematic in the Croatian 
context because it enables to avoid mentioning the concrete crimes com-
mitted by the Ustashe and the NDH regime.
In the second part of the document there are the recommendations for 
the legal regulation for the use of the insignia and symbols. There are no 
recommendations for the education on undemocratic regimes, but it should 
not be surprising because there were no education experts among the mem-
bers of the Council. It is recommended to the legislators that only “prima 
facie disputed insignia of hate could be subject to a special regime of blanket 
prohibitions“. Following insignia are explicitly mentioned: „the fascist Ro-
man salute, the so-called Hitler salute accompanied by the words Sieg heil, 
the Nazi swastika, the Nazi “SS” emblem, the Chetnik cockade, the Ustasha 
“U”, the Ustasha salute “Za dom i poglavnika (For the homeland and its 
leader)” and “Za dom spremni (For the homeland ready)”. One exception, 
however, is tolerated: the use of the salute “For Home–Ready” should be 
allowed for commemorative purposes only, in places or cemeteries where 
members of the HOS died or were buried (Dialog Document, 24–30). 
It is also recommended that “it would not be appropriate for disputed 
insignia that (also) have other, positive meanings […] and are not unam-
biguously recognized as insignia of hate […] to be subject to a blanket pro-
hibition”. The five-pointed red star and the wartime slogan of the Partisan 
movement Death to fascism, freedom to the people were declared “indisput-
able” in all those circumstances when they are used to mark the antifascist 
struggle. But, because of their negative connotations regarding human rights 
violations and mass crimes during the Yugoslav communist rule, as well as 
usage of the red star by the Yugoslav Army during the 1991–1995 war, it 
was left to the legislature to decide how to deal with situations in which they 
are used to promote hatred or violence (Dialog Document, 24–30). Precisely 
this conclusion was the point of controversy which led eight members of the 
Council to deliver separate opinions. In one of these opinions it is said that 
it is unacceptable for the signatories that those symbols and insignia that are 
identified “with the ideas of communist totalitarianism” are not included 
among unambiguously controversial symbols.18 In another dissenting opin-
18 Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by M. Ančić et al. 
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ion, it is stated that by accepting this document, the Council will give a new 
impetus to the “old leftist argument that communism, with all the totalitarian 
deficiencies, is still more acceptable than fascism.”19
As it could be expected, such recommendations did not satisfy any-
body: some were dissatisfied because the Council did not recommend that 
the communist symbols such as the red star should be forbidden by the 
law, and others by the fact that the usage of Ustashe salute was permitted 
in certain circumstances. For a couple of days there was a heated debate 
in the media, and then the Dialogue document slid into oblivion. No law 
on historical memory that was at one point announced by the government 
as an extension of these recommendations, has been produced.20 The com-
memorative plaque with the slogan “For Home–Ready”, which triggered 
the government’s decision about setting up the Council, was removed from 
Jasenovac already in September 2017 and transferred to another location, 
10 kilometers away from its original position. In a way, it seems as if the 
Council’s contradictory recommendations that the Ustashe salute and sym-
bols can be used in special circumstances even though they violate the 
law, served only to belatedly sanction this government’s action. Fruitless 
efforts of the Council for Dealing with the Consequences of Undemocratic 
Regimes are in a way an epitome of Croatia’s troubled dealing with its 
20th century history. The divided memory of World War II, and the way it 
is dealt with in the political arena, will likely continue to create ideologi-
cal rifts, entrench the polarized groups in the society and, most probably, 
undermine coming into terms with the 20th century past. Obviously, these 
debates are not only about the past, but they point at the values that are 
important to the contemporary Croatian society. This is one of the key 
reasons why they have been debated so bitterly. 
19 Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Ž. Tanjić.
20 Minister of Justice mentioned in political talk-show Otvoreno on the Croatian Televi-
sion in November 2018 that the existing framework set by the article 325 of the Penal Law is 
good, and that the Ministry of Justice it only reconsidering whether “some things should be 
defined more precisely”. Retrieved from https://vijesti.hrt.hr/475247/otvoreno-o-optuzama-
za-toleriranje-povijesnog-revizionizma.
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